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CER Computers as Weapons of Mass Disruption: 
The Yugoslav Computer Industry in the 1960s*
Abstract: The article investigates the history of the CER-10, the first Yugo-
slav electronic computer, and the subsequent failed attempt for the establishment 
of the computer industry during the 1960s. While the CER-10 was an important 
milestone on the Yugoslav road to technological modernization, the aftermath 
of this project revealed myriads of problems of the entire Yugoslav state system, 
which included simultaneous implementation of conflicting economic policies, 
the heavy hand of Aleksandar Ranković and the Yugoslav secret police in the 
country’s economy, as well as the channeling of federal funds into Serbian 
companies without much economic rationale, all of which eventually ground 
the establishment of this high-tech industrial sector to a halt. 
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“It is strange to notice […] that after successful application of CER series 
computers [domestic companies] were given import licenses for foreign computer 
equipment without any consultations with domestic designer teams. Computers 
CER […] in that period were, by any criteria, comparable with IBM, DIGITAL, 
ICL, UNIVAC and similar foreign computer equipment.”1
Official history records with much praise and pride the CER-10 [Cifarski Ele-
ktronski Računar – Digital Electronic Computer] as the first Yugoslav electronic 
computer. Designed and constructed in the period between 1956 and 1960 at the 
Institute for Nuclear Sciences “Boris Kidrič” [Institut za nuklearne nauke “Boris 
Kidrič” – IBK; Vinča, near Belgrade, Serbia], the successful CER-10 project added 
* This work was partially supported by the International Visegrad Fund/V4EaP Scholarship [grant 
number 51701420] (www.visegradfund.org). 
1 Paunović, Vladislav and Hristović, Dušan, “Prikaz i analiza računara CER”, XLIV Konferencija 
ETRAN, Sokobanja, June 26–29, 2000, p. 82. (hereinafter: Paunović, V., Hristović, D., “Prikaz i analiza 
računara CER...”) Translation by the author.
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the country’s name on the short list of only five European nations capable to inde-
pendently produce electronic computers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland 
and the Soviet Union). Soon after the successful testing of the prototype in 1960, 
blueprints and the designer team of the CER-10 were transferred to the Institute for 
Electronics and Telecommunications “Mihajlo Pupin” (IMP, Belgrade) where the 
machine capabilities were further improved and by 1962 installed in the building of 
the Yugoslav Federal Nuclear Energy Commission [Savezna komisija za nuklearnu 
energiju – FNEC].2
During the 1960s and 1970s, the IMP designed and produced the entire family of 
CER computers (CER-22, CER-200/202/203, CER-12), including several functional 
prototypes (CER-20 and CER-30) that were used as bookkeeping machines at the 
IMP and Ei Niš [Elektronska industrija Niš]. CER computers were also used for data 
processing in a number of state companies, banks and federal agencies, including the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) which utilized mobile versions in the period between 
1965 and 1989 (CER-11, CER-101-Kosmos, CER-111).3 These Army models were the 
most complex machines designed and built by the IMP, coupled with three models of 
HRS-100 computers [Hibridni računarski sistem – Hybrid Computer System], which 
were produced in cooperation with the Soviet Academy of Sciences and delivered to 
the institutes in Moscow and Novosibirsk.4
This is an appealing story, but a very problematic history. Following the afore-
mentionednarrative behind the CER project, Protić and Ristanović eventually admit, 
with some bitterness attached, that the entire project, “however fascinating it was, 
could not retain the momentum necessary to keep up with the developments of the 
global computer industry.”5 Even the superficial glance on the actual production sta-
tistics of CER computers paints an even less impressive image. The very first CER-10 
was a unique machine, and this scenario was repeated with every successive CER 
model. More precisely, in the period of 15 years (1960-1975) the IMP produced in 
2 Protić, Jelica and Ristanović, Dejan, “Building Computers in Serbia: The First Half of the 
Digital Century”, ComSIS 8, no. 3, June 2011, p. 551. (hereinafter: Protić, J., Ristanović, D., “Build-
ing Computers in Serbia…”) Other important works on the topic include: Bečejski-Vujaklija, Dragana 
and Marković, Nikola (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji: hronika digitalnih decenija, Društvo za 
informatiku Srbije, Institut „Mihajlo Pupin”, PC Press, Beograd 2011 (hereinafter: Bečejski-Vujaklija, 
D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji…); Христовић, Душан, “Развој рачунарства 
у Србији”, Phlogiston: Journal of the History of Science 18/19 2010/2011, pp. 89–105. (hereinafter: 
Христовић, Д., “Развој рачунарства…”); Paunović, V., Hristović, D., “Prikaz i analiza računara 
CER…”, pp. 79–82. 
3 Protić, J., Ristanović, D., “Building Computers in Serbia…”, pp. 551–552; 556–557; Paunović, 
V., Hristović, D., “Prikaz i analiza računara CER…”, p. 78–80. 
4 Bečejski-Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji…, p. 38. 
5 Protić, J., Ristanović, D., “Building Computers in Serbia…”, p. 558.
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total only 25 or 26 computers of different models and two prototypes (Table 1).6 On 
the other hand, many of the experts in the field claim that, at the time of their design 
and production, CER computers could easily compete with contemporary models 
of leading computer manufacturers, such as IBM, DIGITAL, etc., which were more 
readily available and purchased in much higher numbers by Yugoslav state companies 
and government institutions.7
The purpose of this paper isto scrutinize these contradictions that stretch between 
the huge success and almost complete failure of the CER project, and find the missing, 
or indeed, hidden part of the story. My analysis is based on so far unexplored archival 
documents about the CER-10 project, complemented with the existing scholarship 
about the history of computers in Yugoslavia and former Yugoslav republics, as well 
as general history of computers. The main conclusion is that, although the CER-10 
was in fact a modern and functional machine, due to the poor management, legal and 
other administrative limitations, as well as lack of stable and coherent state policies 
related to the use and manufacturing of computers in Yugoslavia, the establishment 
of the computer industry in the country that had a reasonable potential of becoming 
competitive on the global market was, in reality, yet another case of a missed oppor-
tunity. This is particularly important to stress since throughout its history, socialist 
Yugoslavia was striving for a technological proficiency as a part of the general policy 
of the country’s rapid modernization. 
Table 1. CER Family Computers in Production and Operation, 1960-19978 
 91011
Model
Year of design – end of 
operation
Users
Production 
runs
CER-10 1956/60-1966 FNEC, SSUP9, TANJUG10 1
CER-11 1965/66-1988 Yugoslav People’s Army 1
CER-20, CER-30 1963, 1965 IMP, Ei Niš, RIZ, TRS11 1+1
6 Protić, J., Ristanović, D., “Building Computers in Serbia…”, p. 557. CER-200 series, built 
between 1966 and 1971, was the only one with the production run in double digits – 15 were built in 
total, although even in this case, models were fine-tuned towards the needs of particular customers. 
All of the rest models were built either as unique machines or in very small numbers (one to three, yet 
different sources provide different numbers).
7 Paunović, V., Hristović, D., “Prikaz i analiza računara CER...”, p. 82.
8 Protić, J., Ristanović, D., “Building Computers in Serbia…”, p. 557; Paunović, V., Hristović, 
D., “Prikaz i analiza računara CER...”, p. 79. 
9 Savezni sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove (State Secretariat for Internal Affairs) 
10 TANJUG – Telegrafska agencija nove Jugoslavije (Telegraph Agency of New Yugoslavia) 
11 RIZ – Radio industrija Zagreb; TRS – Tvornica računskih strojeva Zagreb (Computing Machines 
Factory, Zagreb)
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CER-22 1966/68-1975
Beobanka, Jugopetrol, 
Beogradski vodovod i 
kanalizacija
2 (3)
CER-200/202/203 1966/71-1985
Planika-Kranj, PIK-Tamiš, 
GIK-Banat, Kanal DTD, 
Mehanografija, Jugopetrol, 
VMA, Ei Niš, Poljobanka, 
IMP
15
CER-12 1969/71-1997
Kreditna banka Zrenjanin, 
ERC IMP
2
CER-101-Kosmos 1972/73-1988 Military Technical Institute 1
CER-111 1974/75-1988 Yugoslav People’s Army 1
Solving Mathematical and National Security Problems
It has to be emphasized that the design and construction of the first electronic 
computer in Yugoslavia was indeed a heroic achievement and a quantum leap in tech-
nological modernization of a country that was highly underdeveloped before 1945 and 
without any experience in this innovativetechnology.12 According to the official data, 
right before the start of the Second World War Yugoslavia was an agricultural country, 
with a roughly 75-78% peasant population, the illiteracy rate as high as 44.6%, only 
1.3% of population with secondary education, and a miniscule 0.15% holding a uni-
versity degree.13 Yugoslav authorities obviously had to invest lots of time, money and 
energy into making such a giant scientific and technological breakthrough. While it is 
not the purpose of this paper to explain the entire process of the rapid modernization 
and development of Yugoslavia after 1945, it would be, nevertheless, important to 
understand first why the Yugoslav authorities developed computer technology.
Often considered as “the first computer”, the ENIAC (Electronic Numerical 
Integrator and Computer) was designed as a general-purpose machine that would 
speed upcalculations for the US Ballistic Research Laboratory, as well as to decipher 
codes. However, the first problem programmed on the ENIAC was a series of cal-
culations for thermonuclear reactions for a project of the Los Alamos Research Lab 
12 The ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer) was designed and built between 
1944 and 1946, and is often considered as the first computer in the world. More in, Williams, Michael 
R., “A Preview of Things to Come: Some Remarks on the First Generation of Computers”, in The First 
Computers – History and Architectures, Rojas, Raúl and Hashagen, Ulf (eds.), The MIT Press, London 
and Cambridge 2000, pp. 1–3. (hereinafter: Williams, M. R., “A Preview of Things to Come…”)
13 Petranović, Branko, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1978, Nolit, Beograd 1981, p. 150. (hereinafter: 
Petranović, B., Istorija Jugoslavije…); Pleština, Dijana, Regional Development in Communist Yugo-
slavia, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1992, pp. 12–13. (hereinafter: Pleština, D., 
Regional Development…)
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in 1945; the ENIAC finalized calculations in two hours (two weeks with the setup) 
that would otherwise require some 100 man-years.14 Using this logic in the opposite 
direction, Nofre argues that the primary reason for the ill-fated establishment of the 
UNESCO International Computation Centre in the late 1940s was the reluctance 
of the US administration to share the high-speed electronic computer technology 
with their West European partners. The main argument was that for the needs of 
mathematical calculations in all branches of science, small digital calculators and 
differential analyzers would be more than sufficient.15 Therefore, a statement may 
be hazarded at this point, that at least in the beginning of the digital age, in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, only developed nuclear programs actually needed electronic 
computers. It would seem highly unlikely that the Yugoslav need for computers was 
comparable to the American. 
Surprising as it may be, the development of computer technology in Yugoslavia 
was in fact a spin-off project of the country’s nuclear program. Yugoslav authorities 
started to pursue their nuclear ambitions almost immediately after the war, with the 
establishment of the IBK, already in 1947/1948.16 The IBK was initially designed as 
the leading institute in the network of a number of different institutions dedicated to 
the development of nuclear science and technology in Yugoslavia.17 Already from the 
beginning, the Yugoslav nuclear program was an important component of the much 
bigger and long-term strategy of assuring the country’s self-sufficiency in the field 
of national defense. The importance of this strategy may be found in the fact that in 
this period almost two thirds of the annual federal budget was channeled to national 
defense projects.18 Stevan Dedijer, the director of the IBK between 1952 and 1954, 
14 Rojas, Raúl and Hashagen, Ulf (eds.), The First Computers – History and Architectures…, pp. 
122–125, 175–176; Protić, J., Ristanović, D., “Building Computers in Serbia…”, p. 549.
15 Nofre, David, “Managing the Technological Edge: The UNESCO International Computation 
Centre and the Limits to the Transfer of Computer Technology, 1946–61,”Annals of Science 71, no. 3, 
2014, pp. 421–422. (hereinafter: Nofre, D., “Managing the Technological Edge…”)
16 Bondžić, Dragomir, Između ambicija i iluzija. Nuklearna politika Jugoslavije 1945–1990, 
Institut za savremenu istoriju, Društvo istoričara Srbije „Stojan Novaković”, Beograd 2016, pp. 58–60. 
(hereinafter: Bondžić, D., Između ambicija i iluzija...); Петровић-Нешковић, Бранислава (ed.), Пола 
века Института „Винча” (1948–1998), Институт за нуклеарне науке „Винча”, Завод за уџбенике 
и наставна средства, Београд 2000, pp. 20–22. (hereinafter: Петровић-Нешковић, Б. (ed.), Пола 
века Института „Винча”...).
17 Петровић-Нешковић, Б. (ed.), Пола века Института „Винча”..., p. 66. Institute for Geo-
logical and Mining Exploration and Research of Nuclear and other Raw Materials (Belgrade, 1947/8), 
Physics Institute “Jožef Stefan” (Ljubljana, Slovenia, 1949) and the Institute for Atomic Physics “Ruđer 
Bošković” (Zagreb, Croatia, 1950). Bondžić, D., Između ambicija i iluzija..., pp. 58–71); Institut za 
tehnologiju nuklearnih i drugih mineralnih sirovina, “Istorijat ITNMS-a”, http://www.itnms.ac.rs/page.
asp?id=istorijat, accessed on January 12, 2018.
18 Alberts, Gerald and Oldenziel, Ruth (eds.), Hacking Europe: from Computer Cultures to Demo-
scenes, Springier, London, Heilderberg, New York, Dordrecht 2014, pp. 109–110 (hereinafter: Alberts, 
G., Oldenziel, R. (eds.), Hacking Europe…).
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reveals details from one secret meeting held in 1950 during which Edvard Kardelj, 
one of the leading Yugoslav politicians and ideologists, declared that Yugoslavia 
must have its own atomic bomb “even if it costs us [the Yugoslavs] half of our entire 
income for years to come.”19
However, the importance of the Yugoslav nuclear program was not directed 
exclusively to the country’s defense strategy. The IBK was also expected to perform 
the role of a leading institution in scientific and industrial development of Yugosla-
via. Already in 1946, Pavle Savić, the leading Yugoslav nuclear scientist and the 
intellectual force behind the establishment of the IBK, wrote a letter to the Yugoslav 
President Josip Broz Tito in which he stressed that the future “Physical Institute” 
should be “the most advanced institution of the kind”, a central institute around which 
the entire “Academic city” and the “state Academy of Sciences” would be established 
“that would coordinate preparation of cadres and raise our [Yugoslav] science and 
industry.”20 In the project proposal it was also mentioned: 
“The Institute will have additional laboratories – cores of future independent 
institutes. The Physical Institute itself would become the center of a network of 
corresponding institutions that will have to be established to meet our [Yugoslav] 
strengths and capabilities and further developed for efficient support of our science 
and technology.”21
Kanazir confirms that the IBK was the country’s “strongest interdisciplinary 
scientific institute” that developed scientific disciplines previously unknown in 
Yugoslavia, and “a center for dissemination of new cadres and new knowledge.”22 
Other authors equally insist that the IBK “spread and supported scientific research 
in companies, institutes and universities” throughout Yugoslavia.23 This concept 
was actually developed into a statutory obligation of the FNEC immediately after 
its establishment in 1955. The FNEC’s Sector for Scientific Research was supposed 
to, among other things, “design programs of scientific research” in industrial and 
19 Dedijer, Stevan, Špijun kojeg smo voljeli: Autobiografija, V.B.Z., Zagreb 2011, p. 177. (here-
inafter: Dedijer, S., Špijun kojeg smo voljeli…). 
20 Arhiv Jugoslavije, Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije, 836, II-6-a/2 (hereinafter: AJ, KMJ 836, II-6-
a/2). Pavle Savić’s letter to Tito, March 17, 1946. 
21 AJ, KMJ 836, II-6-a/2. “Project for the construction of the Physical Institute in Belgrade”, 
March 17, 1946.
22 Јевтић, Милош, Разговори са Винчанцима, Институт за нуклеарне науке „Винча”, Београд 
1998, pp. 47–48. (hereinafter: Јевтић, М., Разговори са Винчанцима...).
23 Четрдсет година Института за нуклеарне науке „Борис Кидрич”, Институт за нуклеарне 
науке „Борис Кидрич”, Београд, 1988, p. 1 (hereinafter: Четрдeсет година Института…)
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university institutes, as well as to provide documentation for prototypes developed 
at the IBK to companies capable for their serial production.24
As strategies go, this one was impressive, and its implementation seems to be 
an equally heroic achievement. The first Yugoslav nuclear reactor, independently 
designed and constructed at the IBK, became fully operational in March 1958. This 
small reactor was supposed to be used as a training machine for the scientists and 
technicians that would operate the much larger 6.5/10 MW Soviet nuclear reactor 
that became operational at the IBK in December 1959. These two powerful research 
instruments were actually main goals of the so-called “Vinča Project” that was in 
full motion in the period 1956-1959.25 In the following years, the Yugoslav nuclear 
program and development of related technologies evolved rapidly. This was recog-
nized by the U.S. Gilpatric Committee already in 1964 which placed Yugoslavia in 
the group of eleven countries that “have or will soon have the capability of making 
nuclear weapons, given the requisite national decision.”26
The IBK scientist obviously needed high-speed calculations. This can be ob-
served in the fact that the first two IBK scientists who received their PhD titles were 
Rajko Tomović and Dušan Mitrović, pioneers in the field of computer science in 
Yugoslavia, and leading designers of the CER-10.27 Tomović and Mitrović started 
tinkering with this technology already in 1947, working for the Ministry of Electricity 
on the development of the “network analyzer”, analogue calculating machine finished 
in 1949 as the first of its kind in Yugoslavia and tenth operational in the world.28 
Already in 1951, Tomović and Mitrović established the Mathematical Laboratoryat 
the IBK with the task to “participate in solving mathematical problems […] and to 
focus on development and construction of electronic calculating machines.”29 The 
results soon followed: based on the Mitrović’s doctoral dissertation, the machine for 
solving systems of 30 linear equations with equal number of variables was designed 
24 AJ, Savezna komisija za nuklearnu energiju 177, f. 22. a.j. 89 (hereinafter: AJ, SKNE 177, 
f. 22, a.j. 89). Organi i tela SKNE. Predsedništvo SKNE, 1955–1956. Poslovnik II sektora Savezne 
komisije za nuklearnu energiju, 1956.
25 Bondžić, D., Između ambicija i iluzija..., pp. 141–146; Петровић-Нешковић, Б., Пола века 
Института „Винча”..., pp. 26–29.
26 Gavin, Francis J., Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca and London 2012, pp. 78–79 (hereinafter: Gavin, Francis J., Nuclear State-
craft…).
27 Христовић, Д., „Развој рачунарства…”, pp. 90–94. 
28 Bečejski–Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., p. 46; Tomović, 
Rajko and Mitrović, Dušan, Elektronika u službi čoveka, BIGZ, Tehnička knjiga, Beograd 1956, pp. 
82–85 (hereinafter: Tomović, R., Mitrović, D., Elektronika...)
29 Bečejski-Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., pp. 45–46; 
Петровић-Нешковић, Б., Пола века Института „Винча”..., p. 226. 
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in 1952, followed by the electronic differential analyzer (1952), this time based on 
the Tomović’s dissertation.30
Combining Yugoslav strategies for scientific development, importance of the 
nuclear program, national defense strategies, the money invested in these projects 
and the IBK’s role in all of them, it would seem logical that computer technology 
and the CER-10 was supposed to play the role of a dual-purpose machine; designed 
both for the civilian and military application and equally capable of solving complex 
mathematical problems, analyses of different electro-mechanical systems, as well as 
the design and management of complex scientific or industrial machines and weapons 
systems.Not surprisingly, this conceptwas indeed put into practice. 
One of the earliest evidence about the cooperation between the FNEC and 
the YPA comes from 1956, when a detailed concept was designed by the State 
Secretariat for National Defense. The idea was that “existing military institutes and 
other military institutions” that were working on scientific research or application 
of modern technologies, “will use the results of nuclear science institutes for the 
needs of their own research.”31 Following this strategy to the letter, in the late 1950s 
the YPA representatives were considerate enough to stress in their shopping list of 
technologies and devices that were supposed to be developed at the IBK, those that 
were also “applicable for civilian protection” and were not necessary to be developed 
independently.32
Focusing exclusively on the development of the electronic computer technology, 
it is worthy to stress that the Military Technical Institute (MTI) also “developed” 
an analogue calculator in 1952, as well as several electronic systems for control of 
artillery fire (after 1961), which included electric computers as integral sub-systems, 
thus pointing to a conclusion that as computer technology was mastered by the IBK, 
it was immediately transferred to military institutes.33 While it is impossible to draw 
strong conclusions without additional evidence, it is nevertheless interesting that the 
development of computertechnology in the MTI and the IBK was so well coordinated. 
At the very least, this suspicion is indirectly confirmed by the fact that even analogue 
calculating machines created by Tomović and Mitrović in the early 1950s were used 
for a variety of calculations in the Federal Statistical Office [Savezni zavod za sta-
30 Tomović, R., Mitrović, D., Elektronika..., pp. 85–88; Петровић-Нешковић, Б., Пола века 
Института „Винча”..., pp. 226–227.
31 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 22, a.j. 89. Organi i tela SKNE. Predsedništvo SKNE, 1955–1956. Zapisnici 
sa sednice Pretsedništva održane 26. maja 1956. godine u Beogradu, May 26, 1956. 
32 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 1. Plan naučno-istraživačkih radova za potrebe narodne odbrane u 1958. 
godini.
33 Vojnotehnički institut Vojske Jugoslavije: 50 godina, Vojnotehnčki institut Vojske Jugoslavije, 
Beograd 1998, pp. 85–86. (hereinafter: Vojnotehnički institut Vojske Jugoslavije...)
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tistiku], but also in the Aeronautical Institute [Vazduhoplovni institut] and Military 
Technical Institute [Vojnotehnički institut].34
The CER-10 project, not unlike its analogue predecessors, was obviously an idea 
engendered by the IBK scientists out of a shear necessity for high-speed calculations 
related to the nuclear program. Furthermore, computer technology was continuously 
being transferred to the national defense sector where similar need for computers 
existed. Thus, by the early 1960s the Yugoslav decision-makers could be satisfied that 
their preset strategy for the country’s scientific and technological modernization, as 
well as for autarchy in the military industry was working as a well tuned machine.
Offspring of the Almighty Creator
Being directly related to the Yugoslav national defense strategy and the ambi-
tious plans for overall modernization, industrialization, and indeed, nuclearization 
of the country, it should not come as a surprise that activities and projectsof the 
IBK were shrouded in secrecy. Bondžić reveals that right from the start the research 
program of the IBK and other institutions dedicated to the nuclear programwere 
under the control of the Yugoslav Directorate for State Security [Uprava državne 
bezbednosti – UDB], headed by Aleksandar Ranković, at the time the Vice-Presi-
dent of the Yugoslav Federal Government and Federal Minister of Interior Affairs. 
In the initial period (1948-1955), the extended arm of the UDB was the Directorate 
for Coordination of the Scientific Institutes [Uprava za koordinaciju rada naučnih 
instituta]. Through this institution the Federal Government and the UDB monitored 
and coordinated all activities of scientific institutes – construction of laboratories, 
provisioning of equipment and raw materials, technical and scientific staff, transfer 
of sensitive technologies, etc.This situation was formalized in 1955 with the estab-
lishment of the FNEC, again under the watchful eye of almighty Ranković who was 
the FNEC’s director until 1962.35
The FNEC was actually the absolute owner of every technology developed in 
scientific institutes under its control and not a single invention or original design could 
have been officially patented, although the dissemination of technology to industrial 
34 Петровић-Нешковић, Б., Пола века Института „Винча”..., p. 226. The Military Techni-
cal Institute became increasingly interested in using computers for high-speed calculations after the 
establishment of the Rocket Institute [Raketni institut] in 1957, which soon led to the development of 
its own Computer Center [Računski centar] as a subsidiary. More in: Dragojević, Milorad, Razvoj našeg 
naoružanja. VTI kao sudbina, Zadužbina Andrejević, Beograd 2003, p. 39. (hereinafter: Dragojević, 
M., Razvoj našeg naoružanja…)
35 Bondžić, D., Između ambicija i iluzija..., pp. 74–76, 117–118. In the moment of the establishment 
of the FNEC Ranković also held the position of the Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council 
(Savezno izvršno veće – Yugoslav Federal Government) and the State Secretary for Internal Affairs. 
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facilities in the country was formally supported.36 The records show that the FNEC 
did not even have to follow standing regulations for the technical documentation, 
thus managing to keep high security standards of their projects. For example, the 
ambitious and very expensive “Vinča Project” was funded by the Federal Executive 
Council (the Yugoslav Federal Government) only on the basis of the FNEC’s approval 
of their own project. This was, of course, made much easier by the fact that Ranković 
was the Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council and personally signed the 
necessary approval, effectively being his own judge, jury and executioner.37 In other 
words, Ranković and the FNEC were behaving like a state-within-a-state institution, 
not responsible even to the federal government, at the very least until 1962 when 
Ranković was removed from the position of the director of the FNEC, or more likely 
until his political demise in 1966.38
The turning point for the CER-10 future was actually the Law on Model of 
Financing Scientific and Research Institutes that was passed in 1960 and began to be 
implemented in 1961. The law stipulated limitations in financing of projects in scien-
tific institutes from the federal budget in order to make them more market oriented; 
the state funding still remained, but only for projects that were approved in advance 
with detailed specifications, designed for companies that were final users of technol-
ogy and were supposed to contribute financially in their development.39 This is again 
in accordance with the existing strategy for the country’s scientific and technological 
modernization in which the IBK played a central role. However, the results were not 
necessarily great. The view from the MTI reveals true dimensions of the impact of 
the law on research institutes. According to Dragojević, by the early 1960s cutting 
down of the defense budget and investments in the MTI’s research projects led to 
abandonment of many complex weapons systems of that were in the prototype stage. 
This shockwave spread quickly to companies in the military and civilian industry that 
cooperated on the MTI projects and produced chaos and financial deficits.40
36 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 1. Zaštita patenta i ustupanje pronalaska fabrikama, July 11, 1957. It is 
almost paradoxical that the complete technical documentation for the CER-10 is still available in the 
archives of the FNEC. 
37 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 22. a.j. 89. Organi i tela SKNE. Predsedništvo SKNE, 1955–1956. Pregled 
investicionog elaborata Projekta Vinča, April 11, 1956; AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 4. Rešenje o nadležnosti za 
odobravanje investicionog programa za određene objekte Instituta „Boris Kidrič” u Vinči, May 21, 
1956.
38 Pirjevec wrote probably the most complete and balanced biography of Ranković, with a detalied 
analysis of his fall. See more in, Pirjevec, Jože, Tito i drugovi, Mozaik knjiga, Zagreb, 2012, pp. 486–518 
(hereinafter: Pirjevec, J., Tito i drugovi…). Compare with: Ranković, Aleksandar, Dnevničke zabeleške, 
Jugoslovenska knjiga, Beograd 2001, passim. (hereinafter: Ranković, A., Dnevničke zabeleške...)
39 Institut „Mihajlo Pupin” – riznica znanja – 60 godina uspešnog rada, Institut „Mihajlo Pupin”, 
Beograd 2006, p. 9 (hereinafter: Institut „Mihajlo Pupin”...); Петровић-Нешковић, Б., Пола века 
Института „Винча”..., pp. 32, 69.
40 Dragojević, M., Razvoj našeg naoružanja…, pp. 39–40.
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The FNEC had to adapt to the given circumstances and by 1960 it was franti-
cally distributing the entire production of the “nuclear instrumentation” to companies 
capable to start their serial production, expecting that “in 1961 domestic companies 
will become completely independent and capable to supply domestic needs in the 
entire specter of standard needs.”41 The documents about the CER-10 reveal the true 
impact of the Law on Model of Financing Scientific and Research Institutes on this 
project and the entire Yugoslav computer industry at the time of its conception. The 
FNEC started officially to channel the funds to the CER-10 project only in 1958. 
At the time, the CER-10 was being developed at the IBK as an experiment for the 
construction of “a single digital electronic calculating machine” for general use.42 
Tomović, one of the leading designers of the CER-10, confirms that the IBK team 
initially wanted to design “a cheaper machine that would have universal applicability 
in solving mathematical problems […] and numerical data processing.”43
However, in an obvious attempt to provide first for the national defense and 
security sector, the FNEC quickly took control of this project and expanded it to 
a production of another version of the CER-10, capable to “perform some special 
programs in statistical data processing.”44 This additional, top secret project of the 
FNEC was initiated in 1959 under the code name “Statistical Arithmetic Machine 
S-2”, and it was ordered specifically for the State Secretariat for Internal Affairs. In 
reality, this was the same machine as the CER-10, only with added Statistical Unit 
[Statistički organ] – the S-2 machine.45 However, by 1960 the FNEC was obviously 
well aware of the new legislation about the financing of scientific projects and the 
technical documentation for the CER-10, coupled with the entire IBK Mathematical 
Laboratory were transferred to the IMP, established only a year earlier as a “scientific 
institution and a high-tech company.” In the following year, and following the same 
logic, even the IBK’s Laboratory for Automatics and Laboratory for Digital Technol-
ogy were also transferred to the IMP.46
41 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 25, a.j. 95. Organi i tela SKNE. Stručni Savet SKNE, 1960–1967. Izveštaj o 
radu u 1960. godini na polju nuklearne instrumentacije, April 26, 1961.
42 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 148, a. j. 1010. Ispitivanje i puštanje u pogon cifarskog elektronskog računara 
(CER). Dokumentacija Instituta „Mihajlo Pupin”, 1961. 
43 Tomović, Rajko, et al., „Cifarski elektronski računar-CER Instituta „Boris Kidrič”, V 
Konferencija ETAN, Beograd, 1960, AU, 1, pp. 305–306. (hereinafter: Tomović, R., et al., „Cifarski 
elektronski računar-CER...“)
44 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 148, a. j. 1010. Ispitivanje i puštanje u pogon cifarskog elektronskog računara 
(CER). Dokumentacija Instituta „Mihajlo Pupin”, 1961. 
45 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 1. Ugovor između Savezne komisije za nuklearnu energiju i Instituta za 
nuklearne nauke „Boris Kidrič” o izradi statističke aritmetičke mašine S-2, February 27, 1959; AJ, 177 
SKNE, f. 1. Strogo poverljivi dopis Instituta „Mihajlo Pupin”, Saveznoj komisiji za nuklearnu energiju, 
October 2, 1961; Tomović, R., et al., „Cifarski elektronski računar-CER...”, pp. 305–314.
46 The IMP was officially established in 1959, although its history dates back to 1946 when the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences (SAS) established the Institute for Telecommunications and Institute 
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Dušan Hristović, one of the scientists involved in the CER-10 project, reveals 
that the IBK was actually supposed to construct two computers, one for the Federal 
Government and one for the State Secretariat for Internal Affairs, but also that the 
IBK team had spent all the money on a single machine and abandoned work on the 
second.47 The contract for the development of the S-2 machine (the CER-10 with 
the Statistical Unit) was signed between the FNEC and IBK in 1959, and by 1961 
when three laboratories were transferred to the IMP, much of the work was already 
finished in the IBK, but could not be continued without the team of scientists who 
developed the project, nor it could be easily started in the new home. This seems to be 
the prime reason why the construction of a second CER-10 never started, even if the 
funding was abundantly available.48 Furthermore, it seems that transfer of the entire 
CER-10 project necessarily produced additional costs, at the very least for salaries 
of people involved in it. With a combined impact of new legislation, already by the 
end of 1961, the director of the IMP was complaining to the FNEC that if additional 
funds are not provided, the IMP would be forced to stop further work on finalization 
of the computer, thus confirming that even the production of a single computer was 
endangered.49
The Law on Model of Financing Scientific and Research Institutes of 1961 
clearly limited the absolute freedom with which the FNEC distributed the federal 
funds. It seems that frantic transfer of technologies and already finished projects that 
had a potential to thrive on the market to civilian industry was an attempt to avoid 
future budget restrictions for the most important projects, all in accordance with the 
new law. Consequently, the FNEC would also retain enough leverage in decisions 
about the financing of the nuclear program that, at least in this phase, had absolutely 
no chanceto be marketed.The FNEC was also very reluctant to relinquish the con-
trol over the CER-10 project to the potentially volatile market conditions, or indeed 
the ownership of sensitive technology to the civilian institute. The fact that the first 
director of the IMP was Đorđe Kovačević, previously the director of the Security 
Institute [Institut bezbednosti], speaks volumes about high security standards of the 
work conducted at the IMP, its role in the wider network under the control of the 
for Electronics. After several years of creation of “spin-off” institutes, in 1950 SAS merged them all 
into the Institute for Research of Electric Phenomena “Nikola Tesla” [Institut za ispitivanje električnih 
pojava]. In 1959, several laboratories of this institute became the core of the IMP. Institut „Mihajlo 
Pupin” – riznica znanja..., p. 5.
47 Vuković, Boris, „Tito obezbedio novac za pravljenje prvog jugoslovenskog računara”, Blic, 
June 11, 2011, https://www.blic.rs/it/tito-obezbedio-novac-za-pravljenje-prvog-jugoslovenskog-
racunara/8ecxdgw, accessed on January 12, 2018.
48 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 1. Izrada aritmetičke mašine (S-2). Dopis Instituta za nuklearne nauke „Boris 
Kidrič” Saveznoj komisiji za nuklearnu energiju, September 8, 1961.
49 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 1. Strogo poverljivi dopis Instituta „Mihajlo Pupin” Saveznoj komisiji za 
nuklearnu energiju, October 2, 1961.
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FNEC, as well as Ranković’s strategy of positioning his close collaborators in the 
most important government and industrial institutions and enterprises.50 The funds 
for finalization of the CER-10 seem to be also provided by Ranković since the final 
order for the computer came from the State Secretariat for Internal Affairs, thus 
again confirming the existence of Ranković’s invisible, yet heavy hand and informal 
channels.51
This combined effort seemed enough to secure the CER-10 future, only not nec-
essarily as the designers initially planned. Theimprovedversion of the CER-10, with 
addition of a Statistical Unit, eventually became a complex (de)ciphering machine 
that was fine tuned specifically for the use by the Yugoslav secret police (UDB) and 
the State Secretariat for Internal Affairs.52 Many years later, several engineers that 
worked on the development of the CER-10 confirmed that the machine was primarily 
designed for “statistical crypto data processing.”53 Hristović also reveals, with some 
pride, that the CER-10 was indeed used to decipher secret coded messages, and at 
least in one occasion, Yugoslav President Tito used information decipheredby the 
CER-10 as a specific ace in the sleeve during his diplomatic missions in the Middle 
East, to the distress of the superpowers.54
This almost anecdotic episode about the successes of the Yugoslav diplomacy 
did not necessarily speed up solving of mathematical or financial problems ofthe 
country’s scientific institutes. Combined with the fact that the distance between the 
FNEC’s headquarters, where the CER-10 was eventually installed, and the IBK was 
some 25 kilometers, it is very difficult to imagine that the first Yugoslav computer 
performed too much of calculations in scientific projects, including the nuclear 
program. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that the management of the IBK 
wasforced already in 1962 not only to buy the West German ZUSE Z23 computer, 
but to share it in following years with other scientific institutes and companies under 
50 Institut „Mihajlo Pupin” – riznica znanja..., p. 9. Kovačević even worked since 1948 as an 
electrical engineer at the State Secretariat for Internal Affairs and obviously presented a tried and tested 
cadre. 
51 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 1. Strogo poverljivi dopis Instituta „Mihajlo Pupin” Saveznoj komisiji za 
nuklearnu energiju, October 2, 1961.
52 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 148, a. j. 1010. Ispitivanje i puštanje u pogon cifarskog elektronskog računara 
(CER). Dokumentacija Instituta „Mihajlo Pupin”, 1961; Tomović, R., et al., „Cifarski elektronski računar-
CER...”, pp. 305–314. Comparing these descriptions of the CER-10, it is evident that the Statistical 
Unit has only been added to the original project. Furthermore, the description of the Statistical Unit in 
the original documentation clearly reveals that its purpose was purely for deciphering codes, or finding 
“coincidences” in two different groups of words and numbers.
53 Bečejski-Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., pp. 37–38.
54 Vuković, Boris, „Tito obezbedio novac za pravljenje prvog jugoslovenskog računara”, Blic, 
June 11, 2011, https://www.blic.rs/it/tito-obezbedio-novac-za-pravljenje-prvog-jugoslovenskog-
racunara/8ecxdgw, accessed on January 12, 2018.
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the control of the FNEC.55 Adding insult to injury, the ZUSE Z23 was not completely 
adequate for calculations related to the Yugoslav nuclear program since it was “slow”, 
although scientists who used it found some comfort in the fact that it was “reliable.”56 
In fact, even though the scientists and engineers of the IBK independently managed 
to develop and construct the CER-10 as a modern electronic computer and primarily 
for problems they needed to solve working on the country’s nuclear program, it is 
absolutely paradoxical that the IBK never actually utilized any model of the CER 
family of computers.57
The additional piece of this confusing puzzle comes from the fact that the 
CER-10 probably was not the first Yugoslav computer. The confusion comes from 
the problem in defining what “the first computer” actually means on a global level 
or in a given society.Williams effectively argues that it is difficult to speak about 
“the first computer” or even “the first generation” of computers since, depending on 
the accepted definition, many machines would fall in or out of the list. Therefore, it 
would be more appropriate to speak about “first computers”, a number of machines 
that were developed in the second half of the 1940s.58
In Yugoslavia, Branko Souček and his team from the Institute for Atomic 
Physics “Ruđer Bošković” (IRB) in Zagreb (Croatia) developed between 1955 
and 1959 the project for the “256-channel, amplitudinal analyzer, memory, logics 
and programs”, which was somewhat similar in design to the CER-10, only much 
faster.59 However, this story is, as with the CER-10, a bit romanticized. In Souček’s 
own words, his “amplitudinal analyzer” was used “for measurements of the energy 
55 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 11. Nabavka digitalne računske mašine „ZUSE-23” za Nuklearni institut u 
Vinči, September 26, 1962; AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 136. Korišćenje digitalne mašine ZUSE Z-23, December 
1964. In 1964, external users of the ZUSE-23 computer were: Energoprojekt, Institut za automa-
tiku i telekomunikacije „Mihajlo Pupin”, (IMP) Matematički institut SRS, Energoinvest-Sarajevo, 
Elektrotehnički fakultet – Beograd, Institut „Ruđer Bošković” – Zagreb, Građevinski institut JNA. 
56 Bečejski-Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., p. 46; Петро-
вић-Нешковић, Б., Пола века Института „Винча”..., p. 229. For certain calculations related to the 
experiments in the nuclear reactor this computer was so slow that the data processing would sometimes 
last for several days. 
57 Петровић-Нешковић, Б., Пола века Института „Винча”..., pp. 226–230; Bečejski-Vujaklija, 
D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., pp. 45–53.
58 Williams, M. R., “A Preview of Things to Come…”, pp. 1–3.
59 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 148, a. j. 1010. Ispitivanje i puštanje u pogon cifarskog elektronskog računara 
(CER). Dokumentacija Instituta „Mihajlo Pupin”, 1961. Compare with Frković, Marijan, et al., “A con-
tribution to the history of computing and informatics in West Balkan countries”, Uporabna Informatika, 
Vol. XXIV, no. 4, 2016, pp. 192–193 (hereinafter: Frković, M., et al., “A contribution to the history…”). 
The author of this article is hardly an expert in computer science, yet the existing information provides 
some clues about the speed of each machine: for the CER-10 it was 100 kc/s (or 100,000 cycles per 
second), while for the Souček’s computer it was “the unbelievable speed of a million cycles per second.” 
Both machines used similar type of ferrite memory and other components purchased abroad.
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specter of radiation”, and not as a general purpose calculating machine.60 Neverthe-
less, Souček’s machine was digital, used similar components as the CER-10, and 
necessarily performed certain calculations, even if designed for a specific purpose.61 
In that respect, it absolutely deserves to be included in the group of “first comput-
ers” in Yugoslavia, neck to neck with the CER-10. In fact, Souček’s computer was 
advanced enough to raise the interest of Willy Higinbotham, at the time the director 
of the U.S. Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), who visited Souček at the IRB 
in 1963 to inquire about his machine. Soon enough, Souček became a researcher in 
the BNL (1964-1966) where he further developed his computer and in following 
years became a renowned scientist in fields of computer science and cybernetics.62 
Although Souček’s intellectual strengths and scientific prowess were proven, he 
obviously lacked the patronage and protection of almighty Ranković and the FNEC 
to contribute to the development of computer technology in Yugoslavia. This should 
not come as a great surprise as it seems that Ranković was predominantly focusing 
on providing lucrative business deals and technical blueprints almost exclusively to 
the companies and institutes in Serbia, although the funding for these project came 
from the federal budget. This was definitively the case with the CER-10.63
Who Needs the CER-10 When We Can Have IBM Computers?
Previous analysis seems to suggest that beside the state security sector and 
scientific institutes there was not much interest for computers in Yugoslavia. The 
reality, however, could not be more different. According to the UN methodology, 
in 1965 Yugoslavia was on the twentieth place in the world in a number of installed 
computers.64 In 1971 the New Scientist and Science Journal announced that Yugoslavia 
was growing “ripe for computer boom.”65 The need and desire for computers in the 
country’s civil sector were obviously strong, only not for CER machines. 
60 Souček, Branko, „256 kanalni amplitudni analizator, memorija, logika, programi,” Elektrotehnika 
u industriji i pogonu, Časopis Elektrotehničkog društva Hrvatske, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1959, p. 132 (hereinafter: 
Souček, B., „256 kanalni amplitudni analizator…”)
61 Souček, B., „256 kanalni amplitudni analizator…”, pp. 132–139.
62 Institut “Ruđer Bošković”, “Professor Branko Souček: Pioneer of computer science and 
cybernetics in Croatia,” http://www.irb.hr/eng/Research/Joint-Scientific-Support-Units/Centre-for-In-
formatics-and-Computing/A-memorial-service-for-professor-Branko-Soucek/Repository/Newspaper-
clippings/Professor-Branko-Soucek-Herak-edition, accessed on January 8, 2018; “Welcome to BNL”, 
BNL Personnel Office Bulletin Board, Vol. 17, No. 52, October 6, 1964, p. 2.
63 During my own research in the FNEC’s archives I did not find a single document about Souček’s 
computer, even though the IRB was under the direct control of the FNEC at the time.
64 Bečejski-Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., p. 110. 
65 “Yugoslavia grows ripe for computer boom”, New Scientist and Science Journal, September 
9, 1971, p. 576. 
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Already in the 1950s a number of state companies, federal institutions and 
banks started to digitalize their administration and production processes. According 
to Hristović, one of the first big computer systems in the country was purchased by 
the Federal Statistical Office [Savezni zavod za statistiku] in 1957, followed in a quick 
succession by the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, National Bank of Yugoslavia, State 
Bookkeeping Office [Služba državnog knjigovodstva], etc.66 The Mining and Smelt-
ing Complex Bor [Rudarsko-topioničarski basen Bor–RTB], at the time one of the 
largest copper mines in Europe, was one of the first Yugoslav industrial enterprises 
to digitalize its data processing already in 1959 with the installation of the Univac 
60 computer system. This trend was visible across the country. Focusing only on 
the Univac 60 model, soon after the RTB Bor, the same system was installed by the 
agriculture machine factory IMT Belgrade [Industrija motora i traktora] and the PIK 
Sljeme [Poljoprivredno-industrijski kombinat Sljeme], food production and processing 
company from Zagreb.67 Official documents reveal that by 1962 there were already 
380 computer systems of various types and manufacturers installed in Yugoslav 
companies and government institutions.68 In the light of this information, the deci-
sion to secure the future of the CER project by offering it to the growing Yugoslav 
computer market seems like a credible strategy. However, the fact remains that very 
few of these machines were CER family computers. The real question is, why?
As mentioned earlier, a total of 25-26 units of CER computers were produced 
until the mid-1970, and not all of them were in simultaneous operation, thus captur-
ing only a small fraction of the Yugoslav market. At the time when the CER-10 was 
finalized in 1962, the IMP already produced and installed one even bigger and more 
complex computer for the YPA, their experts were in the process of developing a 
prototype of the bookkeeping computer (CER-20 and CER-30) and were offering 
to develop another advanced computer system for the use in scientific institutes, 
thus covering the requirements of the market, at least in variety of different types of 
machines.69 While the IMP’s ability to continuously develop modern computers was 
impressive, this is in contradiction with their production records. 
Part of the problem was, yet again, another set of legislation, or indeed, con-
tinuously changing economic policies in the country. Since the introduction of the 
Regulation for the Acquisition of Industrial Property Rights Abroad in 1954, ex-
66 Христовић, Д., „Развој рачунарства…”, p. 102.
67 Milivojević, Dragan R. and Pavlov, Marijana, “Half a Century of Computing in the Serbian 
Copper Mining and Metallurgy Industry”, IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, Vol. 34, No. 
3, July-September 2012, pp. 34–36. (hereinafter: Milivojević, D. R., Pavlov, M., “Half a Century of 
Computing…”)
68 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 11. Nabavka digitalne računske mašine „ZUSE-23” za Nuklearni institut u 
Vinči, September 26, 1962.
69 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 11. Nabavka digitalne računske mašine „ZUSE-23” za Nuklearni institut u 
Vinči, September 26, 1962.
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tended in 1956 also to the import of necessary equipment, decisions for purchasing 
of foreign technology and equipment were firmly in the hands of industrial facili-
ties. In effect, this meant that it was the Yugoslav industry that was deciding which 
part of the national income would be used for purchases of equipment, know-how 
or even which new technologies should be researched and developed, not the central 
government.70 Followed by continued efforts in decentralization and market-oriented 
R&D and production (as with the 1961 Law on Model of Financing Scientific and 
Research Institutes), industrial enterprises reached even greater autonomy over their 
earnings, up to a level of 70 percent by 1965, which simultaneously drained republic 
and federal revenues, and equally, their capability to finance further research or even 
to maintain the existing level of funding.71 At the same time, the IMP eventually man-
aged to orient to the market and secure up to 90-95 percent of its income through a 
variety of contracts with industry, but this happened only in the mid-1970s. It seems 
more likely that most of the 1960s was spent in a slow and even desperate attempt 
to adapt to continuously changing circumstances.72 Focusing only on the process of 
installation and utilization of computers in Yugoslav companies, it is worthy to notice 
that in 1962 the FNEC’s experts were stunned to report that it was “chaotic, almost 
anarchic”, and that actual utilization of capacities of existing machines was in a range 
of only 5-25 percent. It was also remarked that it was “not possible to speak about 
some national benefit with such chaotic purchases of machines [computers].”73
While the Yugoslav decision-makers were stretched between two irreconcilable 
desires, to support the budding indigenous computer industryand market-oriented 
70 AJ, Savezni sekretarijat za industriju 589, f. 296 (hereinafter: AJ, 589 SSI, 296). Analiza reg-
istrovanih ugovora o pribavljanju prava industrijske svojine u inostranstvu, Beograd 1962; Kutlača, 
Đuro and Semenčenko, Dušica, Nacionalni inovacioni sistem u Srbiji: prošlost, sadašnjost, budućnost, 
Institut „Mihajlo Pupin”, Akademska misao, Beograd 2015, p. 85 (hereinafter: Kutlača, Đ., Semenčenko, 
D., Nacionalni inovacioni sistem u Srbiji…). The problem is obviously more complex than suggested 
here. At least for the acquisition of foreign licenses, companies had to receive approval from the Federal 
Secretariat for the Industry. Although, this was often just a formality, since the directors of big industrial 
facilities were in most of the cases members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and could 
easily push their decisions through the system, even if through their unofficial channels. The outcome 
was, nevertheless, the same. 
71 Woodward, Susan, “Review: Reforming a Socialist State: Ideology and Public Finance in Yu-
goslavia”, World Politics 41, No. 2, January 1989, pp. 296–297. (hereinafter: Woodward, S., “Review: 
Reforming a Socialist State…”)
72 Institut „Mihajlo Pupin” – riznica znanja..., p. 5; Bondžić, D., Između ambicija i iluzija..., p. 
223; Петровић-Нешковић, Б., Пола века Института „Винча”..., p. 32. In 1965 nuclear institutes 
managed to secure only 6 percent of their income from contracts with industry, and in the 1970 they still 
received up to 75 percent of their budget from the FNEC. While it is expected that nuclear technology 
was more difficult to market, the gradual switch towards the market must have been unavoidable for 
all other research institutes, with a variable success. 
73 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 11. Nabavka digitalne računske mašine „ZUSE-23” za Nuklearni institut u 
Vinči, September 26, 1962.
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behavior of research institutes and industrial enterprises, the IBM was the quickest 
and most efficient company in filling this gap. Already in the early 1960s, the IBM 
was holding 55 percent of the Yugoslav computer market and 85 percent of the total 
value of installed computers, followed by other companies such as ICL, Univac, 
Bull-General Electric or NCR.74 Furthermore, one of the reasons for purchasing the 
ZUSE Z23 computer for the IBK in 1962 was in fact the desire to establish licensed 
production of these computers in the Slovenian Iskra company; another ZUSE Z23 
was installed in the same year at the Institute of Mathematics, Physics and Mechan-
ics in Ljubljana. Soon enough, the Iskra started the assembly of ZUSE Z23 comput-
ers.75 This expanded into a production of the Iskra ZUSE Z23 V model, yet by 1967 
the ZUSE KG went bankrupted and was bought by Siemens AG and very few of 
Iskra-ZUSE computers reached customers, while the company did not produce other 
computers until the late 1970s.76 Following the country’s decentralization policies, it 
should not be surprising that the entire project for the establishment of the produc-
tion of computers in Slovenia was based on the cooperation between the University 
of Ljubljana, Nuclear Institute “Jožef Stefan”, Iskra, Executive Council of Slovenia 
and several other institutions of Slovenian government that provided most of the 
necessary funding where the FNEC already had limited influence.77
The first Yugoslav company that intended to start the serial production of 
electronic computers based on the CER technology was the Ei Niš [Elektronska 
industrija Niš], and it seems that this was a case of a continued effort to maintain the 
original strategy for the country’s technological modernization. The only difference 
from the Iskra scenario was that it was happening in Serbia. The Ei Niš was one of 
many companies in the network of FNEC’s partnersinvolved in the country’s nuclear 
program, “oriented to the production of complex devices for the ionizing radiation 
protection as well as calculating machines”, but also “the equipment for the hot-lab” 
74 “Yugoslavia grows ripe for computer boom”, New Scientist and Science Journal, September 
9, 1971, p. 576.
75 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 11. Nabavka digitalne računske mašine „ZUSE-23” za Nuklearni institut u 
Vinči, September 26, 1962; Frković, M., et al., “A contribution to the history…”, pp. 195–197; Pivec, 
Franci, “First Real Computers in Slovenia”, IT STAR Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2008, pp. 11–12. (here-
inafter: Pivec, Franci, “First Real Computers…”). Frković and others inquire about the reasons for 
choosing the ZUSE Z23 machine for purchasing the license for the Iskra Kranj, and the archival reveal 
that the sole reason was that the Z23 remained in the country after the Belgrade Technical Fair in 1962, 
and it was decided to use the opportunity not to return the machine, but to purchase for a reduced price 
it for the IBK and Iskra Kranj, eventually hoping for the license agreement with the ZUSE company.
76 Bejek, Miha, et al. (eds.), FRI 20: 20 let Fakultete za računalništvo in informatioko Univerze 
v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za računalništvo in informatiko, Ljubljana 2016, pp. 14–15. (hereinafter: Bejek, 
M., et al. (eds.), FRI 20…); Zuse, Konrad, The Computer-My Life, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg 
GmbH, 1993, p. 153. (hereinafter: Zuse, K., The Computer…)
77 Frković, M., et al., “A contribution to the history…”, p. 197. 
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of the IBK.78 Starting in 1962, the Ei Niš cooperated with the IMP on the development 
of the electronic bookkeeping computer, and the outcome were prototypes CER-20 
and CER-30, used in these two companies. However, the development of indigenous 
computer industry was slow, most likely due to a variety of aforementioned contra-
dictory policies, and the Ei Factory of Computing Machines was established only 
in late 1971. In the following years, the company started to produce a number of 
micro-computers and large computer systems, but this time in cooperation with the 
Kienzle and the Honeywell (in the 1970s and 1980s).79
Rationally analyzing the situation, the Yugoslav authorities wanted to put the 
situation under control and already in the 1960s introduced strict import and export 
regulations that restricted foreign companies from establishing their own affiliates in 
the country. However, this strategy was more oriented to keeping the hard currency 
in the country than anything else, and it was doomed from the start. Due to the fact 
that Yugoslav companies had an ever growing freedom in distribution of their income 
and choosing their production programs, those that were technically and technologi-
cally capable (like Iskra or Ei Niš) more readily represented foreign manufactures on 
the domestic market.80 This only further undermined the development of the indig-
enous computer industry. Eventually, thiscreated a situation in which high diversity 
of computer systems in the country only further limited capacities of data transfer 
between Yugoslav companies and state institutions or agencies, since many of exist-
ing computer systems were not compatible with models of other manufacturers.81 
Therefore, cooperation in the potential technology transfer never appeared „not even 
in their embryonic form.”82 Paradoxically, this confusion on the Yugoslav computer 
market seems to reflect the similar confusion in the entire state, where cooperation 
between Yugoslav republics was in a rapid decline since the early 1960s, even if it 
existed in the previous period. 
The final problem in development of the computer industry in Yugoslavia was a 
highly limited number of educated engineers and technicians. Even foreign observers 
easily identified that in the field of information technologies, “an overriding problem 
for the Yugoslavs is the chronic shortage of adequately trained personnel.”83 One of 
the reasons for the aforementioned low utilization of existing computers in the country 
78 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 25, a.j. 95. Organi i tela SKNE. Stručni Savet SKNE, 1960–1967. Izveštaj o 
radu u 1960. godini na polju nuklearne instrumentacije, April 26, 1961. 
79 Bečejski-Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., p. 64; Христовић, 
Д.,“Развој рачунарства…”, p. 97; Protić, J., Ristanović, D., “Building Computers in Serbia…”, p. 557. 
Another users of CER-20 and CER-30 computers were RIZ Zagreb and TRS Zagreb.
80 Frković, M., et al., “A contribution to the history…”, p. 195.
81 Bečejski-Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., pp. 80–81. 
82 Kutlača, Đ., Semenčenko, D., Nacionalni inovacioni sistem u Srbiji…, p. 85. 
83 “Yugoslavia grows ripe for computer boom”, New Scientist and Science Journal, September 
9, 1971, p. 576.
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was exactly the lack of engineers trained in this field.84 This situation was evident 
already in the early 1960s when it was admitted that “we [Yugoslavia] do not have 
possibility to educate students during their studies, while in other countries machines 
[computers] already became a handy instrument in every technical school.”85
The Electro-Technical Faculty in Belgrade introduced the program for Data 
Processing only in 1967, while the Department for Data Processing was established 
in 1971. However, initially the program was “far below the coursework on famous 
universities”, which was compounded with the fact that the first computer for training 
of students was purchased only in 1968 as a joint effort of a number of state institu-
tions that provided the necessary funding – and it was the IBM 1130, not the CER.86 
On the Mathematical Faculty in Belgrade, the first course in this field was introduced 
in 1961, yet regular lectures started in 1964. Paradoxically, the entire program was 
based on the Soviet literature and university programs, which probably were not 
completely compatible with predominantly American computers that were used in 
Yugoslavia. The situation started to change in 1969, but it was too little too late for 
the country’s emerging computer industry.87
The situation was similar in Slovenia and Croatia. Professor Souček set up the 
first Laboratory for Cybernetics in 1966, and during the 1966/67 he also established 
the Scientific Electronic Computer Center [Znanstveni elektronski računski centar 
– ZRCE]. At the same time, the course Digital Computers was introduced at the 
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Faculty of Science, and in 1970, the Faculty 
of Electrical Engineering introduced a new undergraduate course named Computer 
Science for 3rd and 4th year students, alongside the postgraduate course with the 
same name.88 The ZUSE Z23 computer purchased in Slovenia in 1962, became the 
basis for the establishment of the Computer Centre in the following years, in a joint 
effort by the Institute of Mathematics, Physics and Mechanics and the Nuclear In-
stitute “Jožef Stefan” (NIJS) in Ljubljana, as the first open-access computer center 
in the country.89 The first full computer course called Automatics [Avtomatika] was 
introduced in 1968 at the Electro-Technical Faculty.90
84 AJ, 177 SKNE, f. 11. Nabavka digitalne računske mašine „ZUSE-23” za Nuklearni institut u 
Vinči, September 26, 1962.
85 Ibid.
86 Bečejski-Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., p. 27. 
87 Bečejski-Vujaklija, D., Marković, N. (eds.), 50 godina računarstva u Srbiji..., pp. 56–57.
88 Frković, M., et al., “A contribution to the history…”, p. 194.
89 Pivec, Franci, “First Real Computers…”, pp. 11–12; Gams, Matijaž, “Editorial: ‘Michie-Tur-
ing’ IS2014 Award Recipient: Janez Grad”, Informatica 38, 2014, pp. 311–313. (hereinafter: Gams, 
Matijaž, “Editorial…”). Pivec and Gams differ significantly about the date of the establishment of the 
Computer Center in Ljubljana, stretching between 1962 and 1968, respectively. 
90 Bejek, M., et al. (eds.), FRI 20…, pp. 13–14. 
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Conclusion
The history of the development of the CER-10 and subsequent models of 
CER computers as well as of the attempted establishment of computer industry in 
Yugoslavia presents a sad story that combines moments of incredible successes, 
debilitating mistakes and failed opportunities for a continuously desired, yet often 
illusive technological modernization and scientific development of the country. This 
research had shown that the CER-10 project fell a victim toa complete lack of careful 
planning, coordination and consequently, any coherent strategy in building-up of the 
domestic computer industry. The combined effect of the Regulation for the Acquisi-
tion of Industrial Property Rights Abroad (1954), the Law on Model of Financing 
Scientific and Research Institutes (1961), strict import and export regulations, and 
the fact that the entire technology was at least to a certain degree under the control 
of the FNEC and the security sector during the 1960s, was a complete chaos that 
rendered any attempt of domestic industry to establish serial production of CER 
computers almost impossible. 
The Federal Executive Council was not ready to invest in the production of com-
puters in the country since it required lots of foreign currency they were desperate to 
keep, but which were continuously disappearing due to uncontrollable expenditures of 
state companies. Without the support from the state, restricted from 1961 by the Law 
on Model of Financing Scientific and Research Institutes, the IMP could not afford 
to invest into serial production of computers independently since it was a research 
institute much more than a company and did not have that kind of profit that could 
be easily reinvested. Former IMP engineers admit that it was a general state strategy 
that the funding for further development would dry-up after each successful CER 
computer model, the research team would be automatically reduced, and the design 
of a new model would have to start basically from scratch, but funding for a serial 
production state would not or could not provide.91
Similarly, Yugoslav companies that needed computers were reluctant to purchase 
them from the IMP since CER machines were not readily available, but instead had 
to be ordered and paid in advance, at least partly. This produced a waste of time and 
freezing of assets of potential clients, thus only further complicating the potential start 
of the serial production of computers at the IMP, or possibly Ei Niš. Even though the 
IMP stabilized its profits in the 1970s, foreign companies had already made a strong 
foothold in the Yugoslav market and it would be extremely difficult to replace them. 
At the same time, companies like Iskra, or a bit later Ei Niš, invested their funds in 
purchasing foreign licenses, which was much easier, even if more expensive. It was 
also formally regulated and regularly practiced in the entire industrial sector.
91 Paunović, V., Hristović, D., “Prikaz i analiza računara CER...”, p. 81.
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Even if these problems were somehow successfully circumvented, the remaining 
problem of inadequate number of trained engineers in the field would only further 
undermine any ambitious strategy. In the given circumstances, a successful serial 
production of CER family computers as standard machines in Yugoslavia would be 
equal to a miracle. It seems that the desperate attempt to keep the indigenous computer 
technology alive was through projects for the YPA, which was the most consistent 
customer of CER computers, in addition to a handful of big Yugoslav banks and 
companies for which the IMP constructed unique machines, tailored specifically to 
their needs (Table 1).92 In fact, this rendered the IMP to the level of a high-tech craft 
workshop, which points to a conclusion that the state support for production of com-
puters was actually designed to keep the IMP and its production program alive.
Due to all of aforementioned problems, it is a paradoxical conclusion that the 
country that was on the forefront of development of computer technology in the 
early 1960s, by the end of that decade relegated their ambitions to only keeping alive 
projects and companies out of a sheer desire to avoid mass layoffs and potential dis-
satisfaction among the working class. At the same time, companies that eventually 
started the production of computers based on foreign licenses were fighting only for 
their profits on the expanding market, without participation in any ambitious state 
strategy of the technological modernization. 
Finally, the fact that Ranković is regarded as a Serbian nationalist that had full 
control of the state security sector as well as of the nuclear program during the 1950s 
and 1960s, it may well be argued that the master plan was to develop the entire set of 
technologies necessary for the eventual construction of nuclear reactors (and eventu-
ally atomic bombs) exclusively in Serbian scientific institutes and companies, thus 
potentially increasing his own power exponentially, and securing Serbia’s advantage 
in comparison to other republics. This strategy included the electronic computer 
technology, among others. The “first Yugoslav computer” was developed by the IBK, 
only to be transferred to the IMP which in cooperation with the Ei Niš was supposed 
to establish the computer industry in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Each of these institu-
tions was connected to the central scientific hub of Yugoslavia (and Serbia), the IBK, 
under the direct or indirect control and patronage of Ranković. Even later versions 
of CER computers were purchased almost exclusively by the YPA and Serbian com-
panies. While further elaboration of this hypothesis is impossible to perform within 
the confines of this article, it seems evident that the traditional story behind the fall 
of Ranković in 1966 and his general position in the Yugoslav political establishment 
deserves to be reevaluated and reexamined with some fresh eyes and from a number 
of different perspectives.
92 Paunović, V., Hristović, D., “Prikaz i analiza računara CER...”, p. 81.
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Резиме
МА Марко Миљковић,
ЦЕР рачунари као оружје масовног поремећаја:  
југословенска индустрија рачунара 1960их
Чланак анализира историју развоја ЦЕР-10, првог југословенског рачунара који 
је конструисан у периоду између 1956. и 1960. године у Институту за нуклеарне науке 
„Борис Кидрич” у Винчи. ЦЕР-10 је поставио Југославију на листу свега неколико ев-
ропских земаља које су биле способне да самостално произведу електронске рачунаре 
(Велика Британија, Француска, Немачка, Пољска и Совјетски Савез). Међутим, иако је 
овај пројекат представљао изузетан успех југословенске стратегије научно-технолошког 
развоја, анализа процеса успостављања и изградње рачунарске индустрије у наредној 
деценији открива читав низ системских проблема Југославије у том периоду; од конт-
радикторних стратегија економског развоја, до дубоке умешаности УДБ-е и Александра 
Ранковића у привредни живот земље, која је поред контроле рада научних института 
и привредних капацитета, подразумевала и преусмеравање средстава из федералног 
буџета првенствено у српске компаније. Коначни резултат је и прича о судбини рачунара 
ЦЕР-10 и модела који су касније развијени на основу овог пројекта која представља 
комбинацију великих успеха и подједнако великих промашаја и пропуштених шанси. 
Кључне речи: Југославија, рачунари, ЦЕР-10, нуклеарни програм, УДБ-а, Алек-
сандар Ранковић 
